Internal CIA documents reveal a meticulous protocol that was far more brutal than Dick Cheney's "dunk in the water"
By Mark Benjamin
Salon/AP
In background: Former Vice President Dick Cheney
Self-proclaimed waterboarding fan Dick Cheney called it a no-brainer in a 2006 radio interview: Terror suspects should get a "a dunk in the water." But recently released internal documents reveal the controversial "enhanced interrogation" practice was far more brutal on detainees than Cheney's description sounds, and was administered with meticulous cruelty.
Interrogators pumped detainees full of so much water that the CIA turned to a special saline solution to minimize the risk of death, the documents show. The agency used a gurney "specially designed" to tilt backwards at a perfect angle to maximize the water entering the prisoner's nose and mouth, intensifying the sense of choking - and to be lifted upright quickly in the event that a prisoner stopped breathing.
The documents also lay out, in chilling detail, exactly what should occur in each two-hour waterboarding "session." Interrogators were instructed to start pouring water right after a detainee exhaled, to ensure he inhaled water, not air, in his next breath. They could use their hands to "dam the runoff" and prevent water from spilling out of a detainee's mouth. They were allowed six separate 40-second "applications" of liquid in each two-hour session - and could dump water over a detainee's nose and mouth for a total of 12 minutes a day. Finally, to keep detainees alive even if they inhaled their own vomit during a session - a not-uncommon side effect of waterboarding - the prisoners were kept on a liquid diet. The agency recommended Ensure Plus.
"This is revolting and it is deeply disturbing," said Dr. Scott Allen, co-director of the Center for Prisoner Health and Human Rights at Brown University who has reviewed all of the documents for Physicians for Human Rights. "The so-called science here is a total departure from any ethics or any legitimate purpose. They are saying, 'This is how risky and harmful the procedure is, but we are still going to do it.' It just sounds like lunacy," he said. "This fine-tuning of torture is unethical, incompetent and a disgrace to medicine."
These torture guidelines were contained in a ream of internal government documents made public over the past year, including a legal review of Bush-era CIA interrogations by the Justice Department's Office of Professional Responsibility released late last month.
Though public, the hundreds of pages of documents authorizing or later reviewing the agency's "enhanced interrogation program" haven't been mined for waterboarding details until now. While Bush-Cheney officials defended the legality and safety of waterboarding by noting the practice has been used to train U.S. service members to resist torture, the documents show that the agency's methods went far beyond anything ever done to a soldier during training. U.S. soldiers, for example, were generally waterboarded with a cloth over their face one time, never more than twice, for about 20 seconds, the CIA admits in its own documents.
These memos show the CIA went much further than that with terror suspects, using huge and dangerous quantities of liquid over long periods of time. The CIA's waterboarding was "different" from training for elite soldiers, according to the Justice Department document released last month. "The difference was in the manner in which the detainee's breathing was obstructed," the document notes. In soldier training, "The interrogator applies a small amount of water to the cloth (on a soldier's face) in a controlled manner," DOJ wrote. "By contrast, the agency interrogator ... continuously applied large volumes of water to a cloth that covered the detainee's mouth and nose."
One of the more interesting revelations in the documents is the use of a saline solution in waterboarding. Why? Because the CIA forced such massive quantities of water into the mouths and noses of detainees, prisoners inevitably swallowed huge amounts of liquid - enough to conceivably kill them from hyponatremia, a rare but deadly condition in which ingesting enormous quantities of water results in a dangerously low concentration of sodium in the blood. Generally a concern only for marathon runners , who on extremely rare occasions drink that much water, hyponatremia could set in during a prolonged waterboarding session. A waterlogged, sodium-deprived prisoner might become confused and lethargic, slip into convulsions, enter a coma and die.
Therefore, "based on advice of medical personnel," Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Steven Bradbury wrote in a May 10, 2005, memo authorizing continued use of waterboarding, "the CIA requires that saline solution be used instead of plain water to reduce the possibility of hyponatremia."
The agency used so much water there was also another risk: pneumonia resulting from detainees inhaling the fluid forced into their mouths and noses. Saline, the CIA argued, might reduce the risk of pneumonia when this occurred.
"The detainee might aspirate some of the water, and the resulting water in the lungs might lead to pneumonia," Bradbury noted in the same memo. "To mitigate this risk, a potable saline solution is used in the procedure."
That particular Bradbury memo laid out a precise and disturbing protocol for what went on in each waterboarding session. The CIA used a "specially designed" gurney for waterboarding, Bradbury wrote. After immobilizing a prisoner by strapping him down, interrogators then tilted the gurney to a 10-15 degree downward angle, with the detainee's head at the lower end. They put a black cloth over his face and poured water, or saline, from a height of 6 to 18 inches, documents show. The slant of the gurney helped drive the water more directly into the prisoner's nose and mouth. But the gurney could also be tilted upright quickly, in the event the prisoner stopped breathing.
Detainees would be strapped to the gurney for a two-hour "session." During that session, the continuous flow of water onto a detainee's face was not supposed to exceed 40 seconds during each pour. Interrogators could perform six separate 40-second pours during each session, for a total of four minutes of pouring. Detainees could be subjected to two of those two-hour sessions during a 24-hour period, which adds up to eight minutes of pouring. But the CIA's guidelines say interrogators could pour water over the nose and mouth of a detainee for 12 minutes total during each 24-hour period. The documents do not explain the extra four minutes to get to 12.
Interrogators were instructed to pour the water when a detainee had just exhaled so that he would inhale during the pour. An interrogator was also allowed to force the water down a detainee's mouth and nose using his hands. "The interrogator may cup his hands around the detainee's nose and mouth to dam the runoff," the Bradbury memo notes. "In which case it would not be possible for the detainee to breathe during the application of the water."
"We understand that water may enter - and accumulate in - the detainee's mouth and nasal cavity, preventing him from breathing," the memo admits.
Should a prisoner stop breathing during the procedure, the documents instructed interrogators to rapidly tilt the gurney to an upright position to help expel the saline. "If the detainee is not breathing freely after the cloth is removed from his face, he is immediately moved to a vertical position in order to clear the water from his mouth, nose, and nasopharynx," Bradbury wrote. "The gurney used for administering this technique is specially designed so that this can be accomplished very quickly if necessary."
Documents drafted by CIA medical officials in 2003, about a year after the agency started using the waterboard, describe more aggressive procedures to get the water out and the subject breathing. "An unresponsive subject should be righted immediately," the CIA Office of Medical Services ordered in its Sept. 4, 2003, medical guidelines for interrogations. "The interrogator should then deliver a sub-xyphoid thrust to expel the water." (That's a blow below the sternum, similar to the thrust delivered to a chocking victim in the Heimlich maneuver.)
But even those steps might not force the prisoner to resume breathing. Waterboarding, according to the Bradbury memo, could produce "spasms of the larynx" that might keep a prisoner from breathing "even when the application of water is stopped and the detainee is returned to an upright position." In such cases, Bradbury wrote, "a qualified physician would immediately intervene to address the problem and, if necessary, the intervening physician would perform a tracheotomy." The agency required that "necessary emergency medical equipment" be kept readily available for that procedure. The documents do not say if doctors ever performed a tracheotomy on a prisoner.
The doctors were also present to monitor the detainee "to ensure that he does not develop respiratory distress." A leaked 2007 report from the International Committee of the Red Cross says that meant the detainee's finger was fixed with a pulse oxymeter, a device that measures the oxygen saturation level in the blood during the procedure. Doctors like Allen say this would allow interrogators to push a detainee close to death - but help them from crossing the line. "It is measuring in real time the oxygen content in the blood second by second," Allen explained about the pulse oxymeter. "It basically allows them to push these prisoners more to the edge. With that, you can keep going. This is calibration of harm by health professionals."
> Internal CIA documents reveal a meticulous protocol that was far more > brutal than Dick Cheney's "dunk in the water"
> By Mark Benjamin
> Salon/AP
> In background: Former Vice President Dick Cheney
> Self-proclaimed waterboarding fan Dick Cheney called it a no-brainer in a > 2006 radio interview: Terror suspects should get a "a dunk in the water." > But recently released internal documents reveal the controversial > "enhanced interrogation" practice was far more brutal on detainees than > Cheney's description sounds, and was administered with meticulous cruelty.
> Interrogators pumped detainees full of so much water that the CIA turned > to a special saline solution to minimize the risk of death, the documents > show. The agency used a gurney "specially designed" to tilt backwards at a > perfect angle to maximize the water entering the prisoner's nose and > mouth, intensifying the sense of choking - and to be lifted upright > quickly in the event that a prisoner stopped breathing.
> The documents also lay out, in chilling detail, exactly what should occur > in each two-hour waterboarding "session." Interrogators were instructed to > start pouring water right after a detainee exhaled, to ensure he inhaled > water, not air, in his next breath. They could use their hands to "dam the > runoff" and prevent water from spilling out of a detainee's mouth. They > were allowed six separate 40-second "applications" of liquid in each > two-hour session - and could dump water over a detainee's nose and mouth > for a total of 12 minutes a day. Finally, to keep detainees alive even if > they inhaled their own vomit during a session - a not-uncommon side effect > of waterboarding - the prisoners were kept on a liquid diet. The agency > recommended Ensure Plus.
> "This is revolting and it is deeply disturbing," said Dr. Scott Allen, > co-director of the Center for Prisoner Health and Human Rights at Brown > University who has reviewed all of the documents for Physicians for Human > Rights. "The so-called science here is a total departure from any ethics > or any legitimate purpose. They are saying, 'This is how risky and harmful > the procedure is, but we are still going to do it.' It just sounds like > lunacy," he said. "This fine-tuning of torture is unethical, incompetent > and a disgrace to medicine."
> These torture guidelines were contained in a ream of internal government > documents made public over the past year, including a legal review of > Bush-era CIA interrogations by the Justice Department's Office of > Professional Responsibility released late last month.
> Though public, the hundreds of pages of documents authorizing or later > reviewing the agency's "enhanced interrogation program" haven't been mined > for waterboarding details until now. While Bush-Cheney officials defended > the legality and safety of waterboarding by noting the practice has been > used to train U.S. service members to resist torture, the documents show > that the agency's methods went far beyond anything ever done to a soldier > during training. U.S. soldiers, for example, were generally waterboarded > with a cloth over their face one time, never more than twice, for about 20 > seconds, the CIA admits in its own documents.
> These memos show the CIA went much further than that with terror suspects, > using huge and dangerous quantities of liquid over long periods of time. > The CIA's waterboarding was "different" from training for elite soldiers, > according to the Justice Department document released last month. "The > difference was in the manner in which the detainee's breathing was > obstructed," the document notes. In soldier training, "The interrogator > applies a small amount of water to the cloth (on a soldier's face) in a > controlled manner," DOJ wrote. "By contrast, the agency interrogator ... > continuously applied large volumes of water to a cloth that covered the > detainee's mouth and nose."
> One of the more interesting revelations in the documents is the use of a > saline solution in waterboarding. Why? Because the CIA forced such massive > quantities of water into the mouths and noses of detainees, prisoners > inevitably swallowed huge amounts of liquid - enough to conceivably kill > them from hyponatremia, a rare but deadly condition in which ingesting > enormous quantities of water results in a dangerously low concentration of > sodium in the blood. Generally a concern only for marathon runners , who > on extremely rare occasions drink that much water, hyponatremia could set > in during a prolonged waterboarding session. A waterlogged, > sodium-deprived prisoner might become confused and lethargic, slip into > convulsions, enter a coma and die.
> Therefore, "based on advice of medical personnel," Principal Deputy > Assistant Attorney General Steven Bradbury wrote in a May 10, 2005, memo > authorizing continued use of waterboarding, "the CIA requires that saline > solution be used instead of plain water to reduce the possibility of > hyponatremia."
> The agency used so much water there was also another risk: pneumonia > resulting from detainees inhaling the fluid forced into their mouths and > noses. Saline, the CIA argued, might reduce the risk of pneumonia when > this occurred.
> "The detainee might aspirate some of the water, and the resulting water in > the lungs might lead to pneumonia," Bradbury noted in the same memo. "To > mitigate this risk, a potable saline solution is used in the procedure."
> That particular Bradbury memo laid out a precise and disturbing protocol > for what went on in each waterboarding session. The CIA used a "specially > designed" gurney for waterboarding, Bradbury wrote. After immobilizing a > prisoner by strapping him down, interrogators then tilted the gurney to a > 10-15 degree downward angle, with the detainee's head at the lower end. > They put a black cloth over his face and poured water, or saline, from a > height of 6 to 18 inches, documents show. The slant of the gurney helped > drive the water more directly into the prisoner's nose and mouth. But the > gurney could also be tilted upright quickly, in the event the prisoner > stopped breathing.
> Detainees would be strapped to the gurney for a two-hour "session." During > that session, the continuous flow of water onto a detainee's face was not > supposed to exceed 40 seconds during each pour. Interrogators could > perform six separate 40-second pours during each session, for a total of > four minutes of pouring. Detainees could be subjected to two of those > two-hour sessions during a 24-hour period, which adds up to eight minutes > of pouring. But the CIA's guidelines say interrogators could pour water > over the nose and mouth of a detainee for 12 minutes total during each > 24-hour period. The documents do not explain the extra four minutes to get > to 12.
> Interrogators were instructed to pour the water when a detainee had just > exhaled so that he would inhale during the pour. An interrogator was also > allowed to force the water down a detainee's mouth and nose using his > hands. "The interrogator may cup his hands around the detainee's nose and > mouth to dam the runoff," the Bradbury memo notes. "In which case it would > not be possible for the detainee to breathe during the application of the > water."
> "We understand that water may enter - and accumulate in - the detainee's > mouth and nasal cavity, preventing him from breathing," the memo admits.
> Should a prisoner stop breathing during the procedure, the documents > instructed interrogators to rapidly tilt the gurney to an upright position > to help expel the saline. "If the detainee is not breathing freely after > the cloth is removed from his face, he is immediately moved to a vertical > position in order to clear the water from his mouth, nose, and > nasopharynx," Bradbury wrote. "The gurney used for administering this > technique is specially designed so that this can be accomplished very > quickly if necessary."
> Documents drafted by CIA medical officials in 2003, about a year after the > agency started using the waterboard, describe more aggressive procedures > to get the water out and the subject breathing. "An unresponsive subject > should be righted immediately," the CIA Office of Medical Services ordered > in its Sept. 4, 2003, medical guidelines for interrogations. "The > interrogator should then deliver a sub-xyphoid thrust to expel the water." > (That's a blow below the sternum, similar to the thrust delivered to a > chocking victim in the Heimlich maneuver.)
> But even those steps might not force the prisoner to resume breathing. > Waterboarding, according to the Bradbury memo, could produce "spasms of > the larynx" that might keep a prisoner from breathing "even when the > application of water is stopped and the detainee is returned to an upright > position." In such cases, Bradbury wrote, "a qualified physician would > immediately intervene to address the problem and, if necessary, the > intervening physician would perform a tracheotomy." The agency required > that "necessary emergency medical equipment" be kept readily available for > that procedure. The documents do not say if doctors ever performed a > tracheotomy on a prisoner.
> The doctors were also present to monitor the detainee "to ensure that he > does not develop respiratory distress." A leaked 2007 report from the > International Committee of the Red Cross says that meant the detainee's > finger was fixed with a pulse oxymeter, a device that measures the oxygen > saturation level in the blood during the procedure. Doctors like Allen say
> Internal CIA documents reveal a meticulous protocol that was far more > brutal than Dick Cheney's "dunk in the water"
> By Mark Benjamin
> Salon/AP
> In background: Former Vice President Dick Cheney
> Self-proclaimed waterboarding fan Dick Cheney called it a no-brainer in a > 2006 radio interview: Terror suspects should get a "a dunk in the water." > But recently released internal documents reveal the controversial > "enhanced interrogation" practice was far more brutal on detainees than > Cheney's description sounds, and was administered with meticulous cruelty.
> Interrogators pumped detainees full of so much water that the CIA turned > to a special saline solution to minimize the risk of death, the documents > show. The agency used a gurney "specially designed" to tilt backwards at a > perfect angle to maximize the water entering the prisoner's nose and > mouth, intensifying the sense of choking - and to be lifted upright > quickly in the event that a prisoner stopped breathing.
> The documents also lay out, in chilling detail, exactly what should occur > in each two-hour waterboarding "session." Interrogators were instructed to > start pouring water right after a detainee exhaled, to ensure he inhaled > water, not air, in his next breath. They could use their hands to "dam the > runoff" and prevent water from spilling out of a detainee's mouth. They > were allowed six separate 40-second "applications" of liquid in each > two-hour session - and could dump water over a detainee's nose and mouth > for a total of 12 minutes a day. Finally, to keep detainees alive even if > they inhaled their own vomit during a session - a not-uncommon side effect > of waterboarding - the prisoners were kept on a liquid diet. The agency > recommended Ensure Plus.
> "This is revolting and it is deeply disturbing," said Dr. Scott Allen, > co-director of the Center for Prisoner Health and Human Rights at Brown > University who has reviewed all of the documents for Physicians for Human > Rights. "The so-called science here is a total departure from any ethics > or any legitimate purpose. They are saying, 'This is how risky and harmful > the procedure is, but we are still going to do it.' It just sounds like > lunacy," he said. "This fine-tuning of torture is unethical, incompetent > and a disgrace to medicine."
> These torture guidelines were contained in a ream of internal government > documents made public over the past year, including a legal review of > Bush-era CIA interrogations by the Justice Department's Office of > Professional Responsibility released late last month.
> Though public, the hundreds of pages of documents authorizing or later > reviewing the agency's "enhanced interrogation program" haven't been mined > for waterboarding details until now. While Bush-Cheney officials defended > the legality and safety of waterboarding by noting the practice has been > used to train U.S. service members to resist torture, the documents show > that the agency's methods went far beyond anything ever done to a soldier > during training. U.S. soldiers, for example, were generally waterboarded > with a cloth over their face one time, never more than twice, for about 20 > seconds, the CIA admits in its own documents.
> These memos show the CIA went much further than that with terror suspects, > using huge and dangerous quantities of liquid over long periods of time. > The CIA's waterboarding was "different" from training for elite soldiers, > according to the Justice Department document released last month. "The > difference was in the manner in which the detainee's breathing was > obstructed," the document notes. In soldier training, "The interrogator > applies a small amount of water to the cloth (on a soldier's face) in a > controlled manner," DOJ wrote. "By contrast, the agency interrogator ... > continuously applied large volumes of water to a cloth that covered the > detainee's mouth and nose."
> One of the more interesting revelations in the documents is the use of a > saline solution in waterboarding. Why? Because the CIA forced such massive > quantities of water into the mouths and noses of detainees, prisoners > inevitably swallowed huge amounts of liquid - enough to conceivably kill > them from hyponatremia, a rare but deadly condition in which ingesting > enormous quantities of water results in a dangerously low concentration of > sodium in the blood. Generally a concern only for marathon runners , who > on extremely rare occasions drink that much water, hyponatremia could set > in during a prolonged waterboarding session. A waterlogged, > sodium-deprived prisoner might become confused and lethargic, slip into > convulsions, enter a coma and die.
> Therefore, "based on advice of medical personnel," Principal Deputy > Assistant Attorney General Steven Bradbury wrote in a May 10, 2005, memo > authorizing continued use of waterboarding, "the CIA requires that saline > solution be used instead of plain water to reduce the possibility of > hyponatremia."
> The agency used so much water there was also another risk: pneumonia > resulting from detainees inhaling the fluid forced into their mouths and > noses. Saline, the CIA argued, might reduce the risk of pneumonia when > this occurred.
> "The detainee might aspirate some of the water, and the resulting water in > the lungs might lead to pneumonia," Bradbury noted in the same memo. "To > mitigate this risk, a potable saline solution is used in the procedure."
> That particular Bradbury memo laid out a precise and disturbing protocol > for what went on in each waterboarding session. The CIA used a "specially > designed" gurney for waterboarding, Bradbury wrote. After immobilizing a > prisoner by strapping him down, interrogators then tilted the gurney to a > 10-15 degree downward angle, with the detainee's head at the lower end. > They put a black cloth over his face and poured water, or saline, from a > height of 6 to 18 inches, documents show. The slant of the gurney helped > drive the water more directly into the prisoner's nose and mouth. But the > gurney could also be tilted upright quickly, in the event the prisoner > stopped breathing.
> Detainees would be strapped to the gurney for a two-hour "session." During > that session, the continuous flow of water onto a detainee's face was not > supposed to exceed 40 seconds during each pour. Interrogators could > perform six separate 40-second pours during each session, for a total of > four minutes of pouring. Detainees could be subjected to two of those > two-hour sessions during a 24-hour period, which adds up to eight minutes > of pouring. But the CIA's guidelines say interrogators could pour water > over the nose and mouth of a detainee for 12 minutes total during each > 24-hour period. The documents do not explain the extra four minutes to get > to 12.
> Interrogators were instructed to pour the water when a detainee had just > exhaled so that he would inhale during the pour. An interrogator was also > allowed to force the water down a detainee's mouth and nose using his > hands. "The interrogator may cup his hands around the detainee's nose and > mouth to dam the runoff," the Bradbury memo notes. "In which case it would > not be possible for the detainee to breathe during the application of the > water."
> "We understand that water may enter - and accumulate in - the detainee's > mouth and nasal cavity, preventing him from breathing," the memo admits.
> Should a prisoner stop breathing during the procedure, the documents > instructed interrogators to rapidly tilt the gurney to an upright position > to help expel the saline. "If the detainee is not breathing freely after > the cloth is removed from his face, he is immediately moved to a vertical > position in order to clear the water from his mouth, nose, and > nasopharynx," Bradbury wrote. "The gurney used for administering this > technique is specially designed so that this can be accomplished very > quickly if necessary."
> Documents drafted by CIA medical officials in 2003, about a year after the > agency started using the waterboard, describe more aggressive procedures > to get the water out and the subject breathing. "An unresponsive subject > should be righted immediately," the CIA Office of Medical Services ordered > in its Sept. 4, 2003, medical guidelines for interrogations. "The > interrogator should then deliver a sub-xyphoid thrust to expel the water." > (That's a blow below the sternum, similar to the thrust delivered to a > chocking victim in the Heimlich maneuver.)
> But even those steps might not force the prisoner to resume breathing. > Waterboarding, according to the Bradbury memo, could produce "spasms of > the larynx" that might keep a prisoner from breathing "even when the > application of water is stopped and the detainee is returned to an upright > position." In such cases, Bradbury wrote, "a qualified physician would > immediately intervene to address the problem and, if necessary, the > intervening physician would perform a tracheotomy." The agency required > that "necessary emergency medical equipment" be kept readily available for > that procedure. The documents do not say if doctors ever performed a > tracheotomy on a prisoner.
> The doctors were also present to monitor the detainee "to ensure that he > does not develop respiratory distress." A leaked 2007 report from the > International Committee of the Red Cross says that meant the detainee's > finger was fixed with a pulse oxymeter, a device that measures the oxygen > saturation level in the blood during the procedure. Doctors like Allen say
> Internal CIA documents reveal a meticulous protocol that was far more > brutal than Dick Cheney's "dunk in the water"
> By Mark Benjamin
> Salon/AP
(more opinion)
What Torture Is and Why It's Illegal and Not "Poor Judgment"
Saturday 13 March 2010
by: Andy Worthington, t r u t h o u t | News Analysis
It's now over three weeks since veteran Justice Department (DOJ) lawyer David Margolis dashed the hopes of those seeking accountability for the Bush administration's torturers, but this is a story of such profound importance that it must not be allowed to slip away.
Margolis decided that an internal report into the conduct of John Yoo and Jay S. Bybee, who wrote the notorious memos in August 2002, which attempted to redefine torture so that it could be used by the CIA, was mistaken in concluding that both men were guilty of "professional misconduct," and should be referred to their bar associations for disciplinary action.
Instead, Margolis concluded, in a memo that shredded four years of investigative work by the Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR), the DOJ's ethics watchdog, that Yoo and Bybee had merely exercised "poor judgment." As lawyers in the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), which is charged with providing objective legal advice to the executive branch on all constitutional questions, Yoo and Bybee attempted to redefine torture as the infliction of physical pain "equivalent in intensity to the pain accompanying serious physical injury, such as organ failure, impairment of bodily function, or even death," or the infliction of mental pain which "result[s] in significant psychological harm of significant duration e.g. lasting for months or even years."
Yoo, notoriously, had lifted his description of the physical effects of torture from a Medicare benefits statute and other health care provisions in a deliberate attempt to circumvent the UN Convention Against Torture, signed by President Reagan in 1988 and incorporated into US federal law, in which torture is defined as:
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person ...
Obsessed with finding ways in which "severe pain" could be defined so that the CIA could torture detainees and get away with it, Yoo drew on some truly revolting examples of physical torture, citing a particularly brutal case, Mehinovic v. Vuckovic, in which, during the Bosnian war, a Serb soldier named Nikola Vuckovic had tortured his Bosnian neighbor, Kemal Mehinovic, with savage and sadistic brutality. Yoo dismissed the possibility that other torture techniques - waterboarding, for example, which is a form of controlled drowning, and prolonged sleep deprivation - might cause "significant psychological harm of significant duration," or physical pain rising to a level that a judge might regard as torture.
In both of his definitions, however, Yoo was clearly mistaken. No detailed studies have yet emerged regarding the prolonged psychological effects of the torture program approved by Yoo and Bybee, largely because lawyers for the "high-value detainees" in Guantánamo have been prevented - first under Bush, and now under Obama - from revealing anything publicly about their clients.
However, lawyers for Ramzi bin al-Shibh, who was charged in the Bush administration's military commissions, made a good show of demonstrating that bin al-Shibh is schizophrenic and on serious medication, when they argued throughout 2008 that he was not fit to stand trial, and I have seen no evidence to suggest that bin al-Shibh was in a similar state before his four years in secret CIA prisons.
An even more pertinent example is Abu Zubaydah, a supposed high-value detainee, held in secret CIA prisons for four and a half years, for whom the torture program was originally developed. Zubaydah's case may well be the most shocking in Guantánamo, because, although he was subjected to physical violence and prolonged sleep deprivation, was confined in a small box and was waterboarded 83 times, the CIA eventually concluded that he was not, as George W. Bush claimed after his capture, "al-Qaeda's chief of operations," but was, instead, a "kind of travel agent" for recruits traveling to Afghanistan for military training, who was not a member of al-Qaeda at all.
Zubaydah was clearly mentally unstable before his capture and torture, as the result of a head wound sustained in Afghanistan in 1992, but as one of his lawyers, Joe Margulies, explained in an article in the Los Angeles Times last April, his subsequent treatment in US custody has caused a profound deterioration in his mental health that would certainly constitute "significant psychological harm of significant duration." Margolis wrote:
No one can pass unscathed through an ordeal like this. Abu Zubaydah paid with his mind. Partly as a result of injuries he suffered while he was fighting the communists in Afghanistan, partly as a result of how those injuries were exacerbated by the CIA and partly as a result of his extended isolation, Abu Zubaydah's mental grasp is slipping away. Today, he suffers blinding headaches and has permanent brain damage. He has an excruciating sensitivity to sounds, hearing what others do not. The slightest noise drives him nearly insane. In the last two years alone, he has experienced about 200 seizures.
Moreover, when it came to defining physical torture, the OPR report's authors noted that, as so often in the memos, Yoo had ignored relevant case history. The key passage in the report deals with the US courts' decisions regarding the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA). Yoo had drawn on Mehinovic for his description of physical torture "of an especially cruel and even sadistic nature," and, as the authors noted, he also argued that only 'acts of an extreme nature' that were 'well over the line of what constitutes torture' have been alleged in TVPA cases."
The authors continued:
Thus, the memorandum asserted, "there are no cases that analyze what the lowest boundary of what constitutes torture."[sic]
That assertion was misleading. In fact, conduct far less extreme than that described in Mehinovic v. Vuckovic was held to constitute torture in one of the TVPA cases cited in the appendix to the Bybee memo. That case, Daliberti v. Republic of Iraq, 146 F. Supp. 2d 146 (D.D.C. 2001), held that imprisonment for five days under extremely bad conditions, while being threatened with bodily harm, interrogated and held at gunpoint, constituted torture with respect to one claimant.
A close inspection of Daliberti (which dealt with US personnel seized by Iraqi forces between 1992 and 1995) is revealing, as the DC District Court held, "Such direct attacks on a person and the described deprivation of basic human necessities are more than enough to meet the definition of 'torture' in the Torture Victim Protection Act." The judges based their ruling on the following:
David Daliberti and William Barloon allege that they were "blindfolded, interrogated and subjected to physical, mental and verbal abuse" while in captivity. They allege that during their arrests one of the agents of the defendant threatened them with a gun, allegedly causing David Daliberti "serious mental anguish, pain and suffering." During their imprisonment in Abu Ghraib prison, Daliberti and Barloon were "not provided adequate or proper medical treatment for serious medical conditions which became life threatening." The alleged torture of Kenneth Beaty involved holding him in confinement for eleven days "with no water, no toilet and no bed." Similarly, Chad Hall allegedly was held for a period of at least four days "with no lights, no window, no water, no toilet and no proper bed." Plaintiffs further proffer that Hall was "stripped naked, blindfolded and threatened with electrocution by placing wires on his testicles ... in an effort to coerce a confession from him."
Yoo and his apologists will undoubtedly quibble yet again. There is the threat of electrocution, a threat made with a gun and deprivation of water, in one case for 11 days, none of which feature in the OLC's memos. However, outside of the specific torture program approved by the OLC, numerous prisoners who were held at Bagram before being transported to Guantánamo have stated that they were actually subjected to electric shocks while hooded (rather than being threatened with electrocution), and that being threatened at gunpoint was a regular occurrence.
Moreover, it has also been stated that the withholding of medication was used with Abu Zubaydah after his capture, when he was severely wounded, and it should also be noted that numerous ex-prisoners have stated that, in Guantánamo, it was routine for medical treatment to be withheld unless prisoners cooperated with their interrogators.
Most of all, however, a comparison between Daliberti and the OLC memos reveals the extent to which the techniques approved by Yoo resulted in "severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental," which clearly exceeded that endured by David Daliberti and his fellow Americans in Iraq.
First of all, there is waterboarding, an ancient torture technique that has long been recognized as torture by the United States. As Eric Holder noted during his confirmation hearing in January 2009, "We prosecuted our own soldiers for using it in Vietnam." With this in mind, it ought to be inconceivable that anyone
...
>> Internal CIA documents reveal a meticulous protocol that was far more >> brutal than Dick Cheney's "dunk in the water"
>> By Mark Benjamin
>> Salon/AP
> (more opinion)
> What Torture Is and Why It's Illegal and Not "Poor Judgment"
> Saturday 13 March 2010
> by: Andy Worthington, t r u t h o u t | News Analysis
> It's now over three weeks since veteran Justice Department (DOJ) lawyer > David Margolis dashed the hopes of those seeking accountability for the > Bush administration's torturers, but this is a story of such profound > importance that it must not be allowed to slip away.
> Margolis decided that an internal report into the conduct of John Yoo and > Jay S. Bybee, who wrote the notorious memos in August 2002, which > attempted to redefine torture so that it could be used by the CIA, was > mistaken in concluding that both men were guilty of "professional > misconduct," and should be referred to their bar associations for > disciplinary action.
> Instead, Margolis concluded, in a memo that shredded four years of > investigative work by the Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR), the > DOJ's ethics watchdog, that Yoo and Bybee had merely exercised "poor > judgment." As lawyers in the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), which is > charged with providing objective legal advice to the executive branch on > all constitutional questions, Yoo and Bybee attempted to redefine torture > as the infliction of physical pain "equivalent in intensity to the pain > accompanying serious physical injury, such as organ failure, impairment of > bodily function, or even death," or the infliction of mental pain which > "result[s] in significant psychological harm of significant duration e.g. > lasting for months or even years."
> Yoo, notoriously, had lifted his description of the physical effects of > torture from a Medicare benefits statute and other health care provisions > in a deliberate attempt to circumvent the UN Convention Against Torture, > signed by President Reagan in 1988 and incorporated into US federal law, > in which torture is defined as:
> any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, > is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from > him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an > act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having > committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person ...
> Obsessed with finding ways in which "severe pain" could be defined so that > the CIA could torture detainees and get away with it, Yoo drew on some > truly revolting examples of physical torture, citing a particularly brutal > case, Mehinovic v. Vuckovic, in which, during the Bosnian war, a Serb > soldier named Nikola Vuckovic had tortured his Bosnian neighbor, Kemal > Mehinovic, with savage and sadistic brutality. Yoo dismissed the > possibility that other torture techniques - waterboarding, for example, > which is a form of controlled drowning, and prolonged sleep deprivation - > might cause "significant psychological harm of significant duration," or > physical pain rising to a level that a judge might regard as torture.
> In both of his definitions, however, Yoo was clearly mistaken. No detailed > studies have yet emerged regarding the prolonged psychological effects of > the torture program approved by Yoo and Bybee, largely because lawyers for > the "high-value detainees" in Guantánamo have been prevented - first under > Bush, and now under Obama - from revealing anything publicly about their > clients.
> However, lawyers for Ramzi bin al-Shibh, who was charged in the Bush > administration's military commissions, made a good show of demonstrating > that bin al-Shibh is schizophrenic and on serious medication, when they > argued throughout 2008 that he was not fit to stand trial, and I have seen > no evidence to suggest that bin al-Shibh was in a similar state before his > four years in secret CIA prisons.
> An even more pertinent example is Abu Zubaydah, a supposed high-value > detainee, held in secret CIA prisons for four and a half years, for whom > the torture program was originally developed. Zubaydah's case may well be > the most shocking in Guantánamo, because, although he was subjected to > physical violence and prolonged sleep deprivation, was confined in a small > box and was waterboarded 83 times, the CIA eventually concluded that he > was not, as George W. Bush claimed after his capture, "al-Qaeda's chief of > operations," but was, instead, a "kind of travel agent" for recruits > traveling to Afghanistan for military training, who was not a member of > al-Qaeda at all.
> Zubaydah was clearly mentally unstable before his capture and torture, as > the result of a head wound sustained in Afghanistan in 1992, but as one of > his lawyers, Joe Margulies, explained in an article in the Los Angeles > Times last April, his subsequent treatment in US custody has caused a > profound deterioration in his mental health that would certainly > constitute "significant psychological harm of significant duration." > Margolis wrote:
> No one can pass unscathed through an ordeal like this. Abu Zubaydah > paid with his mind. Partly as a result of injuries he suffered while he > was fighting the communists in Afghanistan, partly as a result of how > those injuries were exacerbated by the CIA and partly as a result of his > extended isolation, Abu Zubaydah's mental grasp is slipping away. Today, > he suffers blinding headaches and has permanent brain damage. He has an > excruciating sensitivity to sounds, hearing what others do not. The > slightest noise drives him nearly insane. In the last two years alone, he > has experienced about 200 seizures.
> Moreover, when it came to defining physical torture, the OPR report's > authors noted that, as so often in the memos, Yoo had ignored relevant > case history. The key passage in the report deals with the US courts' > decisions regarding the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA). Yoo had > drawn on Mehinovic for his description of physical torture "of an > especially cruel and even sadistic nature," and, as the authors noted, he > also argued that only 'acts of an extreme nature' that were 'well over the > line of what constitutes torture' have been alleged in TVPA cases."
> The authors continued:
> Thus, the memorandum asserted, "there are no cases that analyze what > the lowest boundary of what constitutes torture."[sic]
> That assertion was misleading. In fact, conduct far less extreme than > that described in Mehinovic v. Vuckovic was held to constitute torture in > one of the TVPA cases cited in the appendix to the Bybee memo. That case, > Daliberti v. Republic of Iraq, 146 F. Supp. 2d 146 (D.D.C. 2001), held > that imprisonment for five days under extremely bad conditions, while > being threatened with bodily harm, interrogated and held at gunpoint, > constituted torture with respect to one claimant.
> A close inspection of Daliberti (which dealt with US personnel seized by > Iraqi forces between 1992 and 1995) is revealing, as the DC District Court > held, "Such direct attacks on a person and the described deprivation of > basic human necessities are more than enough to meet the definition of > 'torture' in the Torture Victim Protection Act." The judges based their > ruling on the following:
> David Daliberti and William Barloon allege that they were "blindfolded, > interrogated and subjected to physical, mental and verbal abuse" while in > captivity. They allege that during their arrests one of the agents of the > defendant threatened them with a gun, allegedly causing David Daliberti > "serious mental anguish, pain and suffering." During their imprisonment in > Abu Ghraib prison, Daliberti and Barloon were "not provided adequate or > proper medical treatment for serious medical conditions which became life > threatening." The alleged torture of Kenneth Beaty involved holding him in > confinement for eleven days "with no water, no toilet and no bed." > Similarly, Chad Hall allegedly was held for a period of at least four days > "with no lights, no window, no water, no toilet and no proper bed." > Plaintiffs further proffer that Hall was "stripped naked, blindfolded and > threatened with electrocution by placing wires on his testicles ... in an > effort to coerce a confession from him."
> Yoo and his apologists will undoubtedly quibble yet again. There is the > threat of electrocution, a threat made with a gun and deprivation of > water, in one case for 11 days, none of which feature in the OLC's memos. > However, outside of the specific torture program approved by the OLC, > numerous prisoners who were held at Bagram before being transported to > Guantánamo have stated that they were actually subjected to electric > shocks while hooded (rather than being threatened with electrocution), and > that being threatened at gunpoint was a regular occurrence.
> Moreover, it has also been stated that the withholding of medication was > used with Abu Zubaydah after his capture, when he was severely wounded, > and it should also be noted that numerous ex-prisoners have stated that, > in Guantánamo, it was routine for medical treatment to be withheld unless > prisoners cooperated with their interrogators.
> Most of all, however, a comparison between Daliberti and the OLC memos > reveals the extent to which the techniques approved by Yoo resulted in > "severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental,"
>>> Internal CIA documents reveal a meticulous protocol that was far more >>> brutal than Dick Cheney's "dunk in the water"
>>> By Mark Benjamin
>>> Salon/AP
>> (more opinion)
>> What Torture Is and Why It's Illegal and Not "Poor Judgment"
>> Saturday 13 March 2010
>> by: Andy Worthington, t r u t h o u t | News Analysis
>> It's now over three weeks since veteran Justice Department (DOJ) lawyer >> David Margolis dashed the hopes of those seeking accountability for the >> Bush administration's torturers, but this is a story of such profound >> importance that it must not be allowed to slip away.
>> Margolis decided that an internal report into the conduct of John Yoo and >> Jay S. Bybee, who wrote the notorious memos in August 2002, which >> attempted to redefine torture so that it could be used by the CIA, was >> mistaken in concluding that both men were guilty of "professional >> misconduct," and should be referred to their bar associations for >> disciplinary action.
>> Instead, Margolis concluded, in a memo that shredded four years of >> investigative work by the Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR), >> the DOJ's ethics watchdog, that Yoo and Bybee had merely exercised "poor >> judgment." As lawyers in the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), which is >> charged with providing objective legal advice to the executive branch on >> all constitutional questions, Yoo and Bybee attempted to redefine torture >> as the infliction of physical pain "equivalent in intensity to the pain >> accompanying serious physical injury, such as organ failure, impairment >> of bodily function, or even death," or the infliction of mental pain >> which "result[s] in significant psychological harm of significant >> duration e.g. lasting for months or even years."
>> Yoo, notoriously, had lifted his description of the physical effects of >> torture from a Medicare benefits statute and other health care provisions >> in a deliberate attempt to circumvent the UN Convention Against Torture, >> signed by President Reagan in 1988 and incorporated into US federal law, >> in which torture is defined as:
>> any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, >> is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining >> from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for >> an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having >> committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person ...
>> Obsessed with finding ways in which "severe pain" could be defined so >> that the CIA could torture detainees and get away with it, Yoo drew on >> some truly revolting examples of physical torture, citing a particularly >> brutal case, Mehinovic v. Vuckovic, in which, during the Bosnian war, a >> Serb soldier named Nikola Vuckovic had tortured his Bosnian neighbor, >> Kemal Mehinovic, with savage and sadistic brutality. Yoo dismissed the >> possibility that other torture techniques - waterboarding, for example, >> which is a form of controlled drowning, and prolonged sleep deprivation - >> might cause "significant psychological harm of significant duration," or >> physical pain rising to a level that a judge might regard as torture.
>> In both of his definitions, however, Yoo was clearly mistaken. No >> detailed studies have yet emerged regarding the prolonged psychological >> effects of the torture program approved by Yoo and Bybee, largely because >> lawyers for the "high-value detainees" in Guantánamo have been >> prevented - first under Bush, and now under Obama - from revealing >> anything publicly about their clients.
>> However, lawyers for Ramzi bin al-Shibh, who was charged in the Bush >> administration's military commissions, made a good show of demonstrating >> that bin al-Shibh is schizophrenic and on serious medication, when they >> argued throughout 2008 that he was not fit to stand trial, and I have >> seen no evidence to suggest that bin al-Shibh was in a similar state >> before his four years in secret CIA prisons.
>> An even more pertinent example is Abu Zubaydah, a supposed high-value >> detainee, held in secret CIA prisons for four and a half years, for whom >> the torture program was originally developed. Zubaydah's case may well be >> the most shocking in Guantánamo, because, although he was subjected to >> physical violence and prolonged sleep deprivation, was confined in a >> small box and was waterboarded 83 times, the CIA eventually concluded >> that he was not, as George W. Bush claimed after his capture, "al-Qaeda's >> chief of operations," but was, instead, a "kind of travel agent" for >> recruits traveling to Afghanistan for military training, who was not a >> member of al-Qaeda at all.
>> Zubaydah was clearly mentally unstable before his capture and torture, as >> the result of a head wound sustained in Afghanistan in 1992, but as one >> of his lawyers, Joe Margulies, explained in an article in the Los Angeles >> Times last April, his subsequent treatment in US custody has caused a >> profound deterioration in his mental health that would certainly >> constitute "significant psychological harm of significant duration." >> Margolis wrote:
>> No one can pass unscathed through an ordeal like this. Abu Zubaydah >> paid with his mind. Partly as a result of injuries he suffered while he >> was fighting the communists in Afghanistan, partly as a result of how >> those injuries were exacerbated by the CIA and partly as a result of his >> extended isolation, Abu Zubaydah's mental grasp is slipping away. Today, >> he suffers blinding headaches and has permanent brain damage. He has an >> excruciating sensitivity to sounds, hearing what others do not. The >> slightest noise drives him nearly insane. In the last two years alone, he >> has experienced about 200 seizures.
>> Moreover, when it came to defining physical torture, the OPR report's >> authors noted that, as so often in the memos, Yoo had ignored relevant >> case history. The key passage in the report deals with the US courts' >> decisions regarding the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA). Yoo had >> drawn on Mehinovic for his description of physical torture "of an >> especially cruel and even sadistic nature," and, as the authors noted, he >> also argued that only 'acts of an extreme nature' that were 'well over >> the line of what constitutes torture' have been alleged in TVPA cases."
>> The authors continued:
>> Thus, the memorandum asserted, "there are no cases that analyze what >> the lowest boundary of what constitutes torture."[sic]
>> That assertion was misleading. In fact, conduct far less extreme than >> that described in Mehinovic v. Vuckovic was held to constitute torture in >> one of the TVPA cases cited in the appendix to the Bybee memo. That case, >> Daliberti v. Republic of Iraq, 146 F. Supp. 2d 146 (D.D.C. 2001), held >> that imprisonment for five days under extremely bad conditions, while >> being threatened with bodily harm, interrogated and held at gunpoint, >> constituted torture with respect to one claimant.
>> A close inspection of Daliberti (which dealt with US personnel seized by >> Iraqi forces between 1992 and 1995) is revealing, as the DC District >> Court held, "Such direct attacks on a person and the described >> deprivation of basic human necessities are more than enough to meet the >> definition of 'torture' in the Torture Victim Protection Act." The judges >> based their ruling on the following:
>> David Daliberti and William Barloon allege that they were >> "blindfolded, interrogated and subjected to physical, mental and verbal >> abuse" while in captivity. They allege that during their arrests one of >> the agents of the defendant threatened them with a gun, allegedly causing >> David Daliberti "serious mental anguish, pain and suffering." During >> their imprisonment in Abu Ghraib prison, Daliberti and Barloon were "not >> provided adequate or proper medical treatment for serious medical >> conditions which became life threatening." The alleged torture of Kenneth >> Beaty involved holding him in confinement for eleven days "with no water, >> no toilet and no bed." Similarly, Chad Hall allegedly was held for a >> period of at least four days "with no lights, no window, no water, no >> toilet and no proper bed." Plaintiffs further proffer that Hall was >> "stripped naked, blindfolded and threatened with electrocution by placing >> wires on his testicles ... in an effort to coerce a confession from him."
>> Yoo and his apologists will undoubtedly quibble yet again. There is the >> threat of electrocution, a threat made with a gun and deprivation of >> water, in one case for 11 days, none of which feature in the OLC's memos. >> However, outside of the specific torture program approved by the OLC, >> numerous prisoners who were held at Bagram before being transported to >> Guantánamo have stated that they were actually subjected to electric >> shocks while hooded (rather than being threatened with electrocution), >> and that being threatened at gunpoint was a regular occurrence.
>> Moreover, it has also been stated that the withholding of medication was >> used with Abu Zubaydah after his capture, when he was severely wounded, >> and it should also be noted that numerous ex-prisoners have stated that, >> in Guantánamo, it was routine for medical treatment to be
> History has harsh judgment of unethical lawyers. These two will share in > equal part the eternal damnation Bush and Cheney are due. Eternal. Scum > of the earth.
Really, Tim, what is the difference between torturing someone with water and torturing someone with untrimmed posts?
>> History has harsh judgment of unethical lawyers. These two will share in >> equal part the eternal damnation Bush and Cheney are due. Eternal. Scum >> of the earth. > Real Tim, what is tween tort water and me with rim sts?
The former is simulated drowning, the latter is actual drowning.
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